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Evidence
by John E. Hall, Jr.*
W. Scott Henwood
and Alex Battey***
"It is for ordinary minds, and not for psychoanalysts, that our rules of
evidence are framed."'
I.

INTRODUCTION

This year's Survey of evidence finds us in a unique position. The
overhaul of the Georgia Evidence Code (Evidence Code) went into effect
on January 1, 2013. Therefore, appellate cases continue to emerge that
interpret and apply the former rules, providing insight and raising
questions about how the new rules have changed the face of evidence in
Georgia. This Survey highlights cases decided by the Georgia Court of
Appeals and the Georgia Supreme Court between June 1, 2012 and May
31, 2013, that illustrate this tension between the old and new rules of
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evidence. These cases are presented alongside other novel or practically
important case law decided during the survey period.
II.

CASES ILLUSTRATING CHANGES IN THE EVIDENCE CODE

The relative value of hindsight notwithstanding, the following section
of this Survey examines case law decided during the survey period under
rules that have been substantially changed by the new Evidence Code.
The cases below provide several examples of cases that may have come
out differently if decided under the new Evidence Code.
A.

Statements by Co-Conspirators
The hearsay exception for statements made by co-conspirators is a
good example of the way the new evidence rules will practically affect
the admission and exclusion of evidence. First, the actual rule governing
the admission of statements made by co-conspirators has changed;
however, and perhaps more importantly, more general rules governing
the admission of evidence will dramatically change this rule in Georgia.
One case decided during the survey period provides a helpful vehicle
through which to examine these changes.
In Rainey v. State,' the defendant was convicted of criminal attempt
to traffic cocaine and marijuana and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a crime after he, along with his co-conspirators, tried to
buy drugs from an undercover police officer.' On appeal, the defendant
argued that the Superior Court of Fayette County erred in admitting
out-of-court statements made by these co-conspirators.6
The court of appeals rejected this argument, holding, "[t]o render an
out-of-court statement admissible under [former] [section 24-3-5 of the
Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.),'] the prosecution need
only show that it was made by a co-conspirator during an ongoing
conspiracy with the defendant and that it bears sufficient indicia of
reliability."' The court further determined that there was sufficient
evidence for the jury to conclude that the foundation for the co-conspirator's statement had been met under the rule as it existed at the time.9
The statements were made by the co-conspirator while facilitating a
drug transaction, satisfying the requirement that the statements were

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

319 Ga. App. 858, 738 S.E.2d 685 (2013).
Id. at 858, 738 S.E.2d at 685.
Id. at 862, 738 S.E.2d at 690.
O.C.G.A. § 24-3-5 (1995).
Rainey, 319 Ga. App. at 862, 738 S.E.2d at 690-91 (second alteration in original).
Id. at 863, 738 S.E.2d at 691.
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made in furtherance of the conspiracy."o There were sufficient indicia
of reliability because the defendant and his co-conspirators showed up
at the agreed-upon time and location." Further, the co-conspirator
examined the drugs while the defendant showed the officer the money
they were using to buy them."
In a footnote, the court further concluded without explanation that
although it did not apply in this case, the case would be similarly
decided under O.C.G.A. § 24-8-801(dX2)(E)," which now governs the
admissibility of statements by a co-conspirator during the course and in
furtherance of a conspiracy.
Although not discussed by the court,
there are significant changes to the new rule included in O.C.G.A. § 248-801(d)(2)(E). First, the offered statement by the co-conspirator may be
considered in determinating whether the foundation for its admission
exists;" this directly contradicts the previous rule. 6 Under the new
rule, the offered statement alone is not sufficient to establish admissibility; it must be supported by independent evidence.'
The most important change to this rule is not reflected in the text of
O.C.G.A. § 24-8-801(d)(2)(E); rather, the most significant change comes
from O.C.G.A. § 24-1-104(a),'8 which provides:
(a) Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be
a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence
shall be determined by the court, subject to the provisions of subsection
(b) of this [clode section. In making its determination, the court shall
not be bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to
privileges. Preliminary questions shall be resolved by a preponderance
of the evidence standard. 9
Under this rule, the judge, not the jury, determines whether the
statements of a co-conspirator are admissible under the hearsay
exception.20 The reallocation of responsibility for technical admissibility determinations such as this one will change the way evidence is

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id.
Id.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 24-8-801(d)(2)(E) (2013).
Rainey, 319 Ga. App. at 862 n.1, 738 S.E.2d at 691 n.1.
O.C.G.A. § 24-8-801(d)(2XE).
O.C.G.A. § 24-3-5.
O.C.G.A. § 24-8-801(dX2) (2013).
O.C.G.A. § 24-1-104(a) (2013).
Id.
Id.
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presented, as now the judge must be convinced that the preponderance
of the evidence supports the admission of the proffered evidence.
The court in Rainey also concluded that the co-conspirator's statement
could have been admitted under the res gestae hearsay exception.
Under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-3," "[dieclarations accompanying an act,
or so nearly connected therewith in time as to be free from all suspicion
of device or afterthought, shall be admissible in evidence as part of the
res gestae."" As the statements at issue were made in the midst of
planning the transaction, they were admissible as res gestae.24 The
new Evidence Code has done away with this murky rule in favor of the
supposed clarity provided by O.C.G.A. § 24-8-803,25 which provides for
the admission of statements made contemporaneously with the
declarant's perception of the events described; excited utterances made
while the declarant was "under the stress of excitement caused by the
event or condition"; and statements of the declarant's then-existing
mental, emotional, or physical status when relevant to an issue in the
case, as well as a declarant's statement of her intent or plan regarding
her future conduct.26
B. Necessity v. Residual Hearsay Exception
One case decided during the survey period illustrates the changes to
Georgia's old catch-all hearsay exception, which provides for the
admission of hearsay evidence in "specified cases from necessity."
Under this exception, hearsay is admitted if the proponent of the
evidence shows that the statement is relevant and "more probative of a
material fact than other available evidence and that it exhibits ...
guarantees of trustworthiness."28
In Bunnell v. State," the supreme court held that the Superior Court
of Walton County did not err in a murder trial by admitting the
statements of three witnesses describing what the victim said about her
relationship with the defendant."o The defendant was charged with the
murder of a seventy-year-old woman, whom he cared for in exchange for
room and board. The three witnesses were the victim's daughter,
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Rainey, 319 Ga. App. at 863-64, 738 S.E.2d at 691.
O.C.G.A. § 24-3-3 (1995).
Id.
Rainey, 319 Ga. App. at 864, 738 S.E.2d at 691.
O.C.G.A. § 24-8-803 (2013).
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1(b) (1995).
Bunnell v. State, 292 Ga. 253, 255-56, 738 S.E.2d 281, 285-86 (2013).
292 Ga. 253, 735 S.E.2d 281 (2013).
Id. at 256-57, 735 S.E.2d at 286.
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neighbor, and long-time friend, and their statements all concerned
details about disagreements that the victim had with the defendant.'
The trial court and the supreme court held that these statements all met
the requirements of old O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1(b) for admissibility.33
As the court noted in Bunnell, the necessity exception has given way
to the residual exception under the new Evidence Code.' The residual
exception provides that when a statement is not specifically covered by
another provision and contains "equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness," it shall not be excluded if:
(1) The statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (2) The
statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than
any other evidence [that] the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (3) The general purposes of the rules of evidence and
the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the
statement into evidence.35
Further, the proponents of the evidence must notify the opposing party
of their intent to offer the statement and must provide the declarant's
name and address." It remains to be seen how courts will interpret
the new rule's provisions.
C.

Compromise Negotiations and Offers of Settlement
One case decided during the survey period is particularly demonstrative of how apparently significant changes to the Evidence Code may not
practically change much. In Cox v. Mayan Lagoon Estates Ltd. , a
businessman was convicted under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO)," for criminal violations based on transactions between himself, related entities, and an investor. On appeal,
the investor contended that the Superior Court of Cobb County erred by
failing to consider evidence of a settlement proposal because it was
offered to show evidence of an agency relationship at issue in the
case.40 The court of appeals agreed, holding that the exclusion of
"propositions made with a view to a compromise" did not apply when the

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 253-57, 735 S.E.2d at 284-86.
O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1(b) (1995).
Bunnell, 292 Ga. at 256-58, 735 S.E.2d at 286-87 (quoting O.C.GA. § 24-3-1(b)).
Id. at 255 n.2, 735 S.E.2d at 285 n.2.
O.C.G.A. § 24-8-807 (2013).
Id.
319 Ga. App. 101, 734 S.E.2d 883 (2012).
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2012).
Cox, 319 Ga. App. at 101, 734 S.E.2d at 886.
Id. at 101-02, 734 S.E.2d at 886.
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evidence is offered for some other permissible purpose such as to
establish agency."
The new version of this rule (O.C.G.A. § 24-4-4084) appears to offer
more comprehensive protection for settlement negotiations; however,
because of a provision in O.C.G.A. § 24-4-408(c), the new statute would
likely provide the same result in this case. O.C.G.A. § 24-4-408(c)
provides,
This [clode section shall not require the exclusion of any evidence
otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in the course of
compromise negotiations or mediation. This [clode section shall not
require exclusion of evidence offered for another purpose, including, but
not limited to, proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negating a
contention of undue delay or abuse of process, or proving an effort to
obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.
Thus, the seemingly more expansive exclusion of offers of settlement also
codifies an exception that may permit the admission of a broader range
of evidence containing such offers.
D.

Victim's Propensityfor Violence
Under Georgia's former rules, evidence of a murder victim's propensity
for violence could be offered as evidence by the accused upon a prima
facie showing that the victim was the aggressor, and the accused was
acting to defend himself or herself." Several appellate opinions issued
during this survey period interpret this rule, which was altered slightly
by the new Evidence Code.
In State v. Hodges," the supreme court held that the court of appeals
erred in holding that the defendant was permitted to present evidence
regarding a previous incident of violence to support his claim of selfdefense by explaining his state of mind.4 ' The defendant learned of
this alleged incident before killing the victim; however, he did not
witness the incident nor was there any independent evidence to support
it.47 The supreme court stated that the court of appeals opinion
disregarded the safeguards articulated in Chandler v. State,4 under
which the defendant must provide notice of his intent to introduce such

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 104, 734 S.E.2d at 887-88 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 24-3-37 (1995)).
O.C.G.A. § 24-4-408 (2013).
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 24-3-2 (1995).
291 Ga. 413, 728 S.E.2d 582 (2012).
Id. at 413, 418, 728 S.E.2d at 582, 586.
Id. at 414-15, 728 S.E.2d at 583-84.
261 Ga. 402, 405 S.E.2d 669 (1991).
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evidence, present competent evidence to establish the existence of the
prior violent acts, and make a prima facie showing of justification.49
Permitting this evidence would, according to the supreme court, permit
a defendant to evade the "substantive and procedural safeguards of
Chandler"when simply claiming that the evidence is offered to prove the
defendant's state of mind.o
In another case decided recently, the supreme court applied the rule
articulated in Hodges, holding that the trial court properly excluded
evidence of the victim's prior acts of violence against third parties."
Citing Cloud v. State,52 the supreme court determined that the defendant had failed to meet his burden of establishing that the victim was
the aggressor, the victim assaulted the defendant, and the defendant
was honestly trying to defend himself, which were prerequisites to his
presentation of evidence of the victim's propensity for violence."
The new rules of evidence in Georgia change this rule slightly. Under
O.C.G.A. § 24-4-405," specific acts of the victim are not permitted to
show the victim's propensity for violence." Rather, the evidence must
be in the form of opinion evidence only.56
III.

PRESENCE IN THE COURTROOM AS EVIDENCE

The supreme court recently overruled a case discussed in the 2011
survey of Georgia evidence concerning a plaintiff's right to be present in
the courtroom." In Kesterson v. Jarrett," the supreme court held that
a child with cerebral palsy was improperly excluded from the courtroom. 9 The court of appeals had affirmed the Superior Court of Fulton
County, applying a test from the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit, which gives the trial court discretion to exclude a party
from the courtroom when her physical and mental condition could

49. Hodges, 291 Ga. at 415-16, 728 S.E.2d at 584.
50. Id. at 418, 728 S.E.2d at 586.
51. Slaughter v. State, 292 Ga. 573, 576, 740 S.E.2d 119, 122 (2013).
52. 290 Ga. 193, 719 S.E.2d 477 (2011).
53. Slaughter, 292 Ga. at 576, 740 S.E.2d at 122.
54. O.C.G.A. § 24-4-405 (2013).
55. O.C.G.A. § 24-4-405(b).
56. See PAUL S. MILICH, GEORGIA RULEs OF EVIDENCE § 11:4 n.11 (2012-2013 ed.).
57. Kesterson v. Jarrett, 291 Ga. 380, 728 S.E.2d 557 (2012); see also John E. Hall, Jr.
& W. Scott Henwood, Evidence, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 63 MERCER L. REV. 153,
162-63 (2011) (discussing Kesterson v. Jarrett, 307 Ga. App. 244, 704 S.E.2d 878 (2010)).
58. 291 Ga. 380, 728 S.E.2d 557 (2012).
59. Id. at 381, 728 S.E.2d at 559.
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engender improper sympathy from the jury and she could not meaningfully participate in the trial.60
The supreme court reversed, finding that exclusion of a party from the
courtroom was an improper solution to the problem of jury sympathy.e"
Instead, the court concluded that the right of all parties to a fair trial
may be protected by implementation of other measures such as jury
instructions, change of venue, voir dire, and limitation of opening
statements and closing arguments." Interestingly, the court noted that
while a party cannot be treated as a piece of evidence, the party's mental
or physical condition, if "essential and relevant," could be presented and
described like any other "piece of evidence."6 3
Also of note, in its discussion of a party's right to be present at trial,
the court outlined the "venerable rule of sequestration" in Georgia."
Under this longstanding rule, parties who plan to testify in court may
testify first or leave the courtroom until the time that they are called to
testify.65 In a footnote, the court noted that the new Evidence Code
does not change the practical application of this sequestration rule,
because although O.C.G.A. § 24-6-61566 prohibits sequestration of a
party, O.C.G.A. § 24-6-611(a)6 1 permits courts to require a party to
testify prior to other witnesses. 68
This case was applied by the court of appeals in another case decided
during the survey period. In another medical negligence case, the
plaintiff was excluded from the courtroom because he was laying his
head on the table in the courtroom, apparently because he was suffering
from extreme headaches and nausea that he alleged were caused by the
defendant's negligence.6" The court of appeals held that the plaintiff
was improperly excluded because the State Court of Rockdale County did
not attempt any of the alternative remedies outlined in Kesterson before
barring the plaintiff from the courtroom.o Therefore, it seems that a

60. Id. For a full discussion of the facts of Kesterson, see Hall & Henwood, supm note
57, at 162-63.
61. Kesterson, 291 Ga. at 394-96, 728 S.E.2d at 567-69.
62. Id. at 387-88, 728 S.E.2d at 563-64.
63. Id. at 392-93, 728 S.E.2d at 566-67 (quoting Kesterson, 307 Ga. App. at 247, 250,
704 S.E.2d at 882, 885).
64. Id. at 386, 728 S.E.2d at 562.
65. Id.
66. O.C.G.A. § 24-6-615 (2013).
67. O.C.G.A. § 24-6-611(a) (2013).
68. Kesterson, 291 Ga. at 387 n.3, 728 S.E.2d at 563 n.3.
69. Morris v. Turnkey Med. Eng'g, Inc., 317 Ga. App. 295, 295-97, 729 S.E.2d 665,66768 (2012).
70. Id. at 300, 729 S.E.2d at 670 (citing Kesterson, 291 Ga. 380, 728 S.E.2d 557).
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party may not be excluded as a prejudicial piece of evidence under
Georgia law.
IV. EXPRESSIONS OF SYMPATHY

The rule that excludes from evidence expressions of sympathy or
apology made by medical professionals was not significantly changed in
the recent revisions to the Evidence Code. Under Georgia's new law, in
a civil case brought by a patient against a health care provider,
all statements, affirmations, gestures, activities, or conduct expressing
regret, apology, sympathy, commiseration, condolence, compassion,
mistake, error, or a general sense of benevolence [that] is made by a
health care provider or an employee or agent of a health care provider
to the patient ... [that] relates to the unanticipated outcome shall be
inadmissible as evidence and shall not constitute an admission of
liability or an admission against interest 1
The court of appeals recently had the opportunity to interpret this
principle of law as it existed prior to the recent overhaul, in the context
of a motion to exclude such statements filed by the plaintiffs. 72 The
plaintiffs filed a medical malpractice suit alleging professional negligence
during the delivery of their son. Before trial, the plaintiffs filed a motion
in limine to exclude all expressions of sympathy by the defendants and
their counsel at trial. During the hearing on the motion, the State Court
of Cobb County granted the motion but acknowledged that counsel for
defendants were permitted to make, "very limited statements . . . as to
it being a sad situation or something of that nature" and that there were
"certain things [counsel could] say without crossing the line."7
On
appeal, the defendants argued that this ruling prevented them from
expressing any sympathy at trial, an argument the court of appeals
rejected.7 ' Nonetheless, this case demonstrates that, with many rules
of evidence, the line between admissible and inadmissible evidence can
be difficult to determine.

71.
72.
73.
74.

O.C.G.A. § 24-4416(b) (2013).
WellStar Health Sys., Inc. v. Sutton, 318 Ga. App. 802, 734 S.E.2d 764 (2012).
Id. at 802, 805-06, 734 S.E.2d at 765, 767.
Id. at 805-06, 734 S.E.2d at 767-68.

